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Introduction

Ignoring the Biblical admonition not to mistreat strangers, American
states have frequently tried to enact legislation favoring long-term
residents over non-residents and recent arrivals.2 Beginning with the
Warren Court, however, the Supreme Court has held many durational
residency requirements unconstitutional violations of the right to
travel. 3 Long recognized by courts, the right to travel is one of the
few unenumerated constitutional rights which enjoys widespread
rhetorical acceptance. 4

1. Leviticus 24:22 (KingJames).
2. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (discussing Iowa's one year
residency requirement for petitioning for divorce); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (discussing Tennessee's one-year residency requirement for voting); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (discussing Connecticut's one-year residency
requirement for welfare recipients).
3. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
4. In this respect it is useful to contrast the right to travel with other more

controversial unenumerated "rights" such as the right to abortion and the right to die.
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In fact, no Supreme Court justice in American history has voiced
opposition to the general concept of a right to travel.' Nevertheless,
the right to travel remains somewhat of an enigma-an ill-defined
right emanating loosely from various penumbras within the Constitution. 6
This Comment begins by tracing the right to travel from its origins
in the nineteenth century to its zenith in the Warren and early Burger
Courts. It then looks at the current constitutional status of the right
to travel. This Comment suggests that, although the Court continues
to make occasional references to such a right, the Rehnquist Court is
in the midst of significantly scaling back the scope of the right to
travel. The Court has succeeded in narrowing the right to travel
largely by neglect and thus has failed to articulate a well-defined
conception of the right. This Comment argues that this neglect is
detrimental to our constitutional system. Finally, this Comment
explores possible doctrinal underpinnings for the right to travel and
concludes that a scaled-back version of the right to travel is a welcome
development, one that is consistent with both democratic and
communitarian principles underlying our polity. However, the right
to travel should be scaled back explicitly rather than surreptitiously.
II. A Brief History of the Right to Travel
Although barely mentioned in most constitutional law textbooks,7
5. There have, of course, been several differences of opinion over the proper
scope of the right to travel. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-32 (deciding 6 to 3 that
the right to travel bars a state from imposing a one-year durational residency
requirement for eligibility to welfare).
6. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1965) (stating that the right to
travel was conceived in the Articles of Confederation and was necessary to bolster the
stronger Union the Constitution created); see also, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
97 (1908) (recognizing that the right to travel is a right of national citizenship which
arises out of the character of national government); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274
(1900) (noting that the right to move from one place to another is an attribute of
personal liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the
Constitution).
7. Some constitutional law textbooks mention the right to travel when discussing
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, but afford little or no attention to the
historical development of the right. See, e.g., 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW AND POLITICS: VOLUME Two CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1456-66 (1991);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807 (1991) (devoting only one paragraph to discussion of the right to travel as a "Fundamental Interest"). Moreover, other
books on civil rights and civil liberties ignore the right to travel almost entirely, See,
e.g., HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT (1994) (containing no discussion on
the right to travel). The little attention given to the right to travel is understandable
in light of the lack of public controversy surrounding the right, and the relative
infrequency with which the Court invokes the right. Precisely because of this obscurity,
however, the right to travel serves as an ideal subject for scholarly debate. Free from
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the right to travel has been recognized by American courts for more
than 150 years. The first judicial allusion to the right to travel
occurred in the 1823 case Corfield v. CoryelLs Corfield involved a New
Jersey statute prohibiting out-of-state residents from digging clams and
oysters in that state.' The Pennsylvania court upheld the statute but
noted that it was " [ t] he right of a citizen of one state to pass through,
or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
[and] professional pursuits."" The right to travel was not confirmed
by the Supreme Court until Crandall v. Nevada," which was decided
fifty years later. In Crandal, the Court struck down a Nevada tax
levied on railroad and stage companies for each passenger transported
through that state.' 2 Recognizing that similar statutes had the
potential to "totally prevent or seriously burden" citizens moving from
one state to another, the Court concluded that the statute
impermissibly burdened the right to travel.' 3
Since its decision in Crandal4 the Court has repeatedly reconfirmed
the existence of the right to travel. For example, in 1900, Chief
Justice Fuller observed that "[u]ndoubtedly the right of locomotion,
the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty .

. . ."'

Forty years later, in

Edwards v. California,Justice Douglas wrote that all citizens possess a
"right to move freely from [s]tate to [s]tate."15 Despite this historical
tradition, the Court has struggled to identify a doctrinal justification
for the right or provide clear guidance as to what the right protects.
For example, in Cranda, the Court endorsed a rather narrow

pre-existing notions of right and wrong, discussion about the right to travel can focus
on the merits of the right itself and then serve as a model for the study of other rights.
8. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
9. Id. at 547-48.
10. Id. at 552.
11. 73 U.S. 35 (1867). Almost twenty years before Crandall Justice Taney
expressed approval of the right to travel in a dissenting opinion in Smith v. Turner, 48
U.S. 283, 292 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]e are all citizens of the
United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States")
[hereinafter the "Passenger Cases"]. However, a majority of the Court resolved the
Passenger Cases on other grounds and, therefore, failed to address the existence of a
right to travel. See generally Smith, 48 U.S. 283.
12. Crandall, 73 U.S. at 49.
13. Id. at 43-44.
14. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
15. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
alsoToomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (insuring that a "citizen of State A who

ventures into State B [has] the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy");
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868) (recognizing citizens' "right of free ingress
into other [s]tates, and egress from them").
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conception of the right-one that was limited to travel for economic
and governmental purposes.' 6 However, the Court failed to offer any
textual basis for the right. 7 Rather, the Court justified the right on
the more general notion that as "one people, with one common
country... [all] members of the same community must have the right
to pass and repass throughout every part without interruption. " " In
other instances, however, the Court attempted to derive the right from
various clauses in the Constitution. 9 and used the right to find
unconstitutional statutes only tangentially affecting the ability of
citizens to move from one state to another.2"
The expansion of the right's scope reached its zenith during the
2
Warren and Burger Courts. For example, in United States v. Guest, 1
the Court held that the right to travel protected against private as well
as governmental interference with travel.22 In fact, Justice Stewart
described the right to travel as "fundamental to the concept of our
Federal Union" 23 and "secured against interference from any source
whatever, whether governmental or private." 24 Then, in the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thompson,25 the Court ruled that
Connecticut's one-year residency requirement for welfare recipients
was unconstitutional because of its chilling effect on the right to
travel. 26 However, rather than declaring the statute a direct violation

16. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867). The Court wrote that each citizen
"has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon
that government, or to transact any business he may have with it." Id. Likewise, the
Court noted that it would not tolerate statutes that "totally prevent or seriously burden"
the right to travel. Id. at 46. It would appear, therefore, that only restrictions that
physically prevent and not merely touch upon travel related to business or government,
would run afoul of the Crandall Court's conception of the right.
17. See Cranda, 73 U.S. at 49.
18. Id. at 48-49.
19. See, e.g., Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178 (Douglas,J., concurring) (concluding that the
right to travel stems from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (Fuller, C.J.) (stating that
"the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any [s]tate is a
right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and other provisions of the Constitution"); Paul, 75 U.S. at 168 (deriving right from the Commerce Clause).
20. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 21-37 and
accompanying text.
21. 383 U.S. 745 (1965) (involving private conspiracy to discourage blacks from

entering the state).
22. Id. at 759.
23. Id. at 757.
24. Id. at 760 n.17.
25. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
26. Id. at 631 ("If a law has 'no other purpose ... than to chill the assertion of
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it [is]
patently unconstitutional.") (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss2/14

4

19951

Hartch: Wrong Turns: A RIGHT
Critique of
Supreme Court'S Right to Travel Ca
TOthe
TRAVEL

of the right to travel, the Court applied an equal protection analysis,
subjecting the statute to strict scrutiny review27 on the grounds that
the right to travel was a "fundamental right."2" Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion echoed these sentiments, proclaiming the right to
be a "virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the
Constitution to all of us." 29 Finally, in Dunn v. Blumstein,30 the
Court continued its assault on durational residency requirements-this
time striking down a one-year residency requirement for voting as a
direct infringement on a "fundamental personal right, the right to
travel" 3' even though there had been no showing of actual interference or deterrence.3 2
The expansion of the right to travel into a virtually unfettered right,
safeguarding travel against even incidental and imaginary restraints,
was not lost on all members of the Court.3 3 In Guest, Justice Harlan
noted that none of the constitutional sources proffered for the right
to travel could justify its extension to interference by private individuals. 34 Likewise, Chief Justice Warren balked at the notion that state
residency requirements were per se unconstitutional "merely because
[they] burden[] the right to travel."3 5 Faced with this criticism, the
Court held to its sweeping formulation of a "virtually unconditional
personal right"36 but did not offer a justification for expanding the
scope of the right.37 In fact, rather than explain its actions, the
Court simply abandoned the attempt to find a textual basis for the
right.38 As Justice Brennan candidly admitted several years later, "the
frequent attempts to assign the right to travel some textual source in

(1968)).
27. When the Court applies strict scrutiny review, it will uphold legislation only if
it is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (4th ed. 1991).

28. Id. at 630-31.
29. Id. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
31. Id. at 338. "It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is
the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of
welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other 'right to travel' cases in this Court
always relied on the presence of actual deterrence." Id. at 339-40.
32. Id.
33. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 763 (1966) (Harlan,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
34. Id. at 767.
35. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 649 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 643 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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have proved both inconclusive and unneces-

Having jettisoned any textual limitation on the right without
formulating its own definition, the Court found itself in a bind. On
the one hand, the logic of Guest, Shapiro, and Dunn suggested that a
whole range of additional statutes imposing residency requirements
were unconstitutional. 40 Yet, given the sheer magnitude of the
statutes involved, the Court 4 appeared reluctant to engage in a

wholesale assault on state law. '

The result was a quixotic period of indecision as the Burger Court
labored in vain to make sense of the right to travel. Without text or
rationale for guidance, the Court reached seemingly inexplicable
results. For example, the Court sustained Iowa's one-year residency
requirement for citizens petitioning for divorce,42 but struck down
Arizona's similar one-year residency requirement for access to free
non-emergency medical coverage.4"
The Court also began to
scrutinize so-called welcome stranger tax schemes benefitting longterm residents over new arrivals under the rubric of the right to
travel. 41 In Zobel v. Williams, the Court struck down Alaska's income

39. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring).
40. At one point in the mid-1970s, it appeared that hundreds of statutes ranging
from zoning laws to state bar residency requirements might be invalidated. See, e.g.,
Thomas Steel, The Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HAST. L. J. 849 (1975)
(arguing that zoning laws violate the right to travel); Note, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of
State BarResidency Requirements Under the InterstatePrivilegesand Immunities Clause ofArticle
IV 92 HARV. L. REv. 1461, 1462 (1979) (suggesting that residency requirements for
state bar exams discriminate against nonresidents); Note, Durational Residency
Requirements for Candidatesfor State and Local Office Violate Equal Protection, 22 KAN. L.
REV. 113 (1973) [hereinafter Durational Residency Requirements] (suggesting that

residency requirements for publicly elected officials are unconstitutional).
41. Id.
42. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). For commentary suggesting that Sosna is
inconsistent with other decisions, see Note, DurationalResidence Requirementsfrom Shapiro
through Sosna: The Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 622 (1975). For
an attempt to reconcile Sosna with other cases, seeJ. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation
and FundamentalRights in ConstitutionalLaw, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 953, 986-987 (1978).
43. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974) (rejecting
Arizona's durational residency requirement, for free medical care, since it penalizes
indigents for exercising their right to migrate and settle in that state).
44. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986)
(invalidating civil service exam preference for veterans who had state residency at time
of entry into the military); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(finding New Mexico's statute which granted tax exemption to all Viemam War
veterans who were New Mexico residents prior to May 8, 1976 unconstitutional);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1984) (striking down use tax on cars as violation of
right to travel); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (holding Alaska's income
distribution plan unconstitutional).
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distribution plan as an infringement on the right to travel.45 The
Justices, however, failed to agree over the reasoning.46 Writing for
the Court, Chief Justice Burger employed a "minimum rationality"
test 7 but still found the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that
none of the state's proffered purposes were legitimate.4" As for the
right to travel, Burger relegated it to a footnote in which he observed
that "[i] n reality, [the] right to travel analysis refers to little more than
a particular application of equal protection analysis."49 In contrast,
concurrences by Justices Brennan and O'Connor treated the right to
travel as a fundamental right which required strict scrutiny and thus
was distinct from traditional equal protection analysis.5 0 Finally, in
his dissent, Justice Rehnquist disavowed the applicability of the right
to travel because there had been
no showing that the plan impeded
51
state.
the
entering
from
people
By the close of the Burger Court, therefore, both the Court's
doctrinal approach to the right to travel and the resulting case law
were muddled.5 2 Two hundred years of constitutional adjudication
made clear that a right to travel existed, but beyond that little was
known.
The Court failed to define the parameters of the right,
identify a compelling rationale for the right, or resolve the case law in
a coherent and consistent fashion. 4 As one commentator concluded,
the Court's analysis of the right to travel "forms a fragmented,
complex, and confusing mass of interlocking, overlapping theories " in
5
dire need of some ordering principle or overarching explanation. 1

45. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. For individual Justice's reasonings, see id. at 58; id. at 66 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. When the Court applies minimum rationality review, it will uphold legislation
only if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. SeeNowAK,
supra note 27.
48. Zobe/, 457 U.S. at 60-61.
49. Id. at 60 n.6.
50. Id. at 66 (Brennan,J., concurring) (stating that Alaska's dividend-distribution
law "clearly, though indirectly" burdens the right to travel); Id. at 74 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (alleging that right to travel derives from the Privileges and Immunities
clause).
51. Id. at 83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the distribution plan
"impedes no person's right to travel to and settle in Alaska; if anything, the prospect
of receiving annual cash dividends would encourage immigration to Alaska").
52. See supra part II; see also supra notes 42, 43, 44 & 46 and accompanying text.
53. See supra part II; see also supra notes 42, 43, 44 & 46 and accompanying text.
54. See supra part II; see also supra notes 42, 43, 44 & 46 and accompanying text.
55. Bryan H. Wildenthal, State Parochialism,the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Artide IV, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1557, 1557 (1989) (suggesting that the
Court should derive the right to travel from the Privileges and Immunities clause).
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III. The Rehnquist Court and the Right to Travel's Vanishing Act
With the arrival of several new justices and a new Chief Justice, one
might have expected the Rehnquist Court to make some headway
toward resolving the confusion surrounding the right to travel.
Unfortunately, rather than resolving the continuing questions about
the right to travel, the Court has ignored the problem, paying lip
service to the right's existence while curtailing its application without
explanation.5 6 Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Court's
failure to address these continuing questions is the scarcity with which
the Court has made reference to the right to travel."
Since the
inception of the Rehnquist Court in 1986, the Court has mentioned
the right in only nine opinions. 8 Moreover, even in these cases the
right to travel has often been relegated to the footnotes or a dissent,
as if it were an afterthought. 9
The Court's most extensive recent analysis of the right to travel
occurred in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.6 0 In Bray, the

Court was asked to decide whether pro-life activists had violated the
petitioner's right to interstate travel by blocking access to abortion
clinics. 6 In rejecting this claim, the Court declared that the "federal
guarantee of interstate travel ...

protects interstate travelers against

two sets of burdens: 'the erection of actual barriers to interstate
movement' and 'being treated differently' from intrastate travelers.""

56.
57.
58.

See infra note 58.
See infra text accompanying notes 58 & 59.
See Northwest Airlines v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855, 858 (1994) (holding

that airport user fees assessed against commercial airlines did not discriminate against
interstate travel); Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 n.7 (1994) (refusing to consider
the issue of interstate travel because petitioner did not raise the issue in his petition for
certiorari); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, l13A S. CL 753, 762 (1993)
(concluding that anti-abortionists' obstruction of access to abortion clinic did not
restrict women's right to travel); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2842
n.5 (1992) (noting that although state regulation of travel is permissible, a state may
not categorically exclude non-residents from its borders); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.
Ct. 2326, 2332 (1992) (rejecting taxpayer's right to travel and right to vote claims);
Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1863 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting a
conflict between the right to travel and the right to vote); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439, 446 (1991) (comparing the right to travel with the right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation).
59. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, 114 S.Ct. at 861 (citing congressional committee
report which alludes to right to travel); Albrght, 114 S.Ct. at 815-17 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (discussing briefly right to travel of criminal defendants); Burson, 112 S.Ct.
at 1863 (StevensJ., dissenting).
60. 113AS. Ct. 753 (1993).
61. Id. at 763.
62. Id. (quoting Zobe/, 457 U.S. at 60).
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Noting that the only "actual barriers to movement" were "in the
immediate vicinity of the abortion clinics," the Court concluded that
the right had not been violated.6"
It then went on to say that
intrastate restrictions did not implicate the right of interstate travel
even when applied intentionally against travelers from out-of-state,
unless applied discriminatorily against them.'
Justice Stevens
vigorously dissented, arguing that the "right to travel includes the right
to unobstructed interstate travel to obtain an abortion and other

medical services. "65
Several observations can be gleaned from Bray. First, the Court was
interested in construing the right to travel narrowly so that every
minor physical restraint on movement would not give rise to a
constitutional challenge based on the right to travel.66 Second, the
Court conceived of the right to travel as pertaining solely to interstate
travel, while intrastate travel is devoid of constitutional protection.6 7
Finally, although clearly favoring a narrower conception of the right,
the majority was not willing to completely abolish the right.6"
Additional evidence for the Court's hostility to the right to travel is
apparent in its decision in Nordlinger v. Hahn,69 upholding the
constitutionality of Proposition 13.70 Approved by the California
electorate in 1978, Proposition 13 places a one percent ceiling on the
state's property tax rate and caps annual increases in assessment
valuations at two percent of the property's 1975-76 market value so
long as the property is not sold.7 ' Property transferred after 1976,
however, is subject to a step-up 72 in assessment value equal to the fair
market value of the property.73
The effect of Proposition 13,

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bray, 113A S. Ct. 753, 782 (1993) (quoting National Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
66. Id. at 763 (noting that the federal guarantee of interstate travel does not
transform state law torts into federal offenses when they are committed against
interstate travelers).
67. Id.
68.

Id.

69. 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
70. Id. at 2335-36.
71. Id. at 2329. Proposition 13 was approved by 64.8% of the California electorate
in November of 1978. Steven T. Lawrence, Solving the Proposition 13 Puzzle: From Amador
to Nordlinger-JudicialChallenges and Alternatives, 24 PAC. L.J. 1769, 1773 (1993). For a
comprehensive history and analysis of constitutional challenges to Proposition 13, see
generally id
72. See generally Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992) (discussing the
appraised value of real property).
73. Proposition 13 provides for two notable exceptions to this step-up in
assessment value. First, transfers from parents to children are completely exempted
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therefore, has been to penalize new owners of property by significantly
inflating the assessment value of7 their
property while protecting long4
term residents against increases.
Proposition 13 does not create any direct impediments to travel, but
it does impose indirect burdens analogous to those created by the
Alaskan distribution scheme in Zobel75 Recall that in Zobel the Court
struck down the income distribution plan as a violation of the right to
travel because of its potential for indirectly discouraging citizens from
moving out of the state. 76 As Justice Brennan explained:
For if each State were free to reward its citizens incrementally for
their years of residence, so that a citizen leaving one State would
thereby forfeit his accrued seniority ...
then the mobility so
essential to the economic progress of our Nation, and so commonly
accepted
as a fundamental aspect of our social order, would not long
77
survive.

According to Brennan, therefore, a statute that discourages citizens

from leaving a state by benefitting long-term residents is an unconstitutional restraint on travel.7 s
In Nordlinger, the Court bypassed the petitioner's argument that
Proposition 13 violated her "constitutional right to travel" 79 on the
grounds that she lacked standing to raise the claim.8" In the words
of the Court:
[T]he complaint does not allege that petitioner herself has been
impeded from traveling or from settling in California because ...
prior to purchasing her home, petitioner lived in an apartment in
Los Angeles. This Court's prudential standing principles impose a
"general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal
rights." Petitioner has not identified any obstacle preventing others
who wish to travel or settle in California from asserting claims on
their own behalf, nor has she shown any special relationship with
those whose rights she seeks to assert, such that we might overlook
this prudential limitation.8 '

from the increase. Id. Second, persons aged 55 and over can transfer the 1976 base
value of their original home to another house of equal or less value, thereby lessening
the step-up in assessment value. Id.
74. Id. at 2329.
75. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
76. Id. at 66 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 68.
78. Id.
79. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (1992).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, the Court applied a rational basis analysis 2 and concluded that
the state had a "legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation,
continuity, and stability." 3
The Court's denial of standing signaled a heightened standard
inconsistent with prior right to travel cases such as Dunn, where the
Court had expressly rejected the notion that actual evidence of
deterrence must be shown when asserting a violation of the right to
Nevertheless, even under this heightened standard, the
travel.8 4
NordlingerCourt could have granted standing. The Court premised its
conclusion to deny standing on the fact that the right to travel affords
no protection to intrastate travel.8 5 This assertion is itself controversial, but conceding this point, the Court should have considered not
just whether Proposition 13 had prevented the petitioner from
entering the state but also if it deterred her from leaving the

82. The rational basis test is the same as minimum rationality review. See NOWAK,
supra note 27.
83. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2333.
84. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330. On the other hand, Nordlingermay be part

of a more restrictive approach towards standing in general. See Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.

REv. 881 (1983).
85. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (1992). The Court failed to provide
an explanation for distinguishing interstate and intrastate travel. One reason why the
Court may have resolved the case without a more complete analysis of the right to

travel is that it had struck down a similar West Virginia property tax assessment scheme
in 1989 without reaching the right to travel issue. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. County Comm'n of Wester County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (holding county tax
assessment scheme to be unconstitutional).
The Court's decision in Allegheny surprised many observers and received some
criticism. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, SUPREME COURT WATCH 254-55 (1993) (noting that
Allegheny constituted only the second time in the past half century that the Court has
extended the equal protection clause to protect economic rights); Robert Jerome
Glennon, Taxation and Equal Protection, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261, 262-63 (1990)
(stating that the implications of Allegheny are "ominous" and that the decision should
be "discarded quickly").
In Nordlinger the Court distinguished Allegheny on the grounds that the West
Virginia scheme had been initiated by a county and was inconsistent with the West
Virginia Constitution. Nordlinger,112 S.Ct. at 2330-34. Thus, the Court reasoned that
it violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct.
at 2335. For commentary suggesting that Allegheny and Nordlinger are logically
indistinguishable, see Samuel A. Mandarino, This Town Ain't Big Enough For the Both of
Us, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1195; Michael D. Rawlins, Taxation, Equal Protection, and Inquiry
into the Purpose of a Law: Nordlinger v. Hahn and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.

County Comm'n, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1001-1018.

In his concurrence in Nordlinger,

Justice Thomas wrote that Allegheny should be expressly overruled. 112 S. Ct. at 2336

(Thomas, J., concurring).
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as Justice Brennan argued that Alaska's plan had done in
state-just
s6
ZobeL
Consider the plight of a California resident aged fifty-five who has
lived in the same house for twenty years.8 7 If she moves within
California, she can transfer the low pre-1976 assessment value in her
current house to a new residence, thereby minimizing the amount she
pays in property taxes."s On the other hand, if she decides to move
"accrued
of her
to Nevada, she loses all the value
but
rather
dividends
in
higher
income
here
not
seniority"S-manifest
9
Zobel
framework,
under
the
analyzed
taxes.
"
Thus,
property
lower
Proposition 13 impermissibly penalizes the exercise of the constitutional right to travel. 9'
Rather than undertaking this type of analysis, the Nordlinger Court
used standing as a slight of hand to ignore the right to travel.92
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens recognized the similarities between
Nordlinger and Zobel and argued that "it [was] irrational to treat
similarly situated persons differently on the basis of the date they
joined the class of property owners."93 For support, Justice Stevens
quoted a particularly apt portion of the Court's decision in Zobel:
If the states can make the amount of a cash dividend depend on
length of residence, what would preclude varying university tuition
on a sliding scale based on years of residence - or even limiting

86. 457 U.S. at 68. The Court noted that if each state were free to reward its
citizens incrementally for their years of residence, so that a citizen leaving one state
would thereby forfeit his accrued seniority only to have to begin building such seniority
again in his new state of residence, then mobility so essential to the economic progress
of our nation would not long survive. Id.
87. The Court's opinion in Nordlinger does not specify the age of the petitioner.
The hypothetical here assumes that the petitioner is aged 55 and therefore can take
advantage of the special exemption for older residents. However, the hypothetical
applies equally well to a younger resident. In fact, the burden on younger residents
may be greater because they may be compelled not to change residences until they
reach age 55 so that they do not lose the low assessment values of their homes.
88. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2329 (distinguishing an acquisition system of taxation
from the more commonplace "current value" taxation).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. "Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a 'welcome stranger'
system-the newcomer to an established community is 'welcome' in anticipation that
he will contribute a larger percentage of support for local government than his settled
neighbor who owns a comparable home." Id.
92. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (1992). The Court analyzed the
right to travel from the perspective of one moving to California and failed to consider
how the State of California penalizes its owns citizens, for example impeding their right
to travel through Proposition 13. See also, Wildenthal, supranote 55 and accompanying
text.
93. Nordlinger, 112 S. Ct. at 2347 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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access of finite public facilities, eligibility for student loans, for civil
service jobs, or for government contracts by length of domicile?
Could states impose different taxes based on length of residence?. Alaska's
reasoning could open the door to state apportionment of other
rights, benefits, and services according to length of residency.'
Thus, Stevens concluded that Proposition 13 was unconstitutional.95
Justice Stevens' analysis, while at least cognizant of the historical
tension between the Court's decision and prior right to travel cases,
remains somewhat baffling. In particular, his dissenting opinion in
Nordlinger purported to apply a rational basis test,96 rather than the
strict scrutiny analysis urged by the petitioners and usually afforded to
statutes infringing upon fundamental rights.97 This confusion over
the standard of review is also evident in Justice Stevens' opinion in
Hodgson v. Minnesota." In Hodgson, where he again suggested that
the right to travel did not require strict scrutiny, Justice Stevens stated:
In cases involving.., the right to travel or the right to marry, the
identification of the constitutionally protected interest is merely the
beginning of the analysis. State regulation of travel and of marriage
is obviously permissible even though a State may not categorically
exclude nonresidents from its borders . ...
But the regulation of
constitutionally protected decisions, such as where a person shall
reside or whom he or she shall marry, must be predicated on
legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the
individual has made.9
On the other hand, in Burson v. Freeman,1°° Justice Stevens cited with
approval the Court's decision in Dunn to use strict scrutiny when
confronted with a statute burdening the right to travel.'
Taken
together, Stevens' opinions in Nordlinger, Hodgson, and Burson make
clear that he views the right to travel as an important right; but his
inability to place the right to travel in the Court's conception of a
tiered equal protection analysis is2 indicative of the general confusion
0
surrounding the right to travel.

94. Id. at 2347-48 (quoting Zobe4 457 U.S. at 64) (emphasis added by Stevens).
95. Id. at 2348.
96. See id. at 2332 ("The appropriate standard of review is whether the difference
in treatment between newer and older owners rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest.").
97. Id.
98. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
99. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 435 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
100. 112 S.Ct. 1846 (1992).
101. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1863 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
102. In this regard, the Court's right to travel jurisprudence is emblematic of a
much larger problem, namely the confusion surrounding the Court's doctrinal
approach in the area of equal protection analysis and the Court's ad hoc adoption of
a two-tiered, three-tiered, or sliding-scale approach.
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In addition, none of the justices have offered a convincing
explanation for why the right to travel should be confined to interstate
travel as opposed to both interstate and intrastate travel. In Bray, the
Court cited three cases to support its contention that the right pertains
solely to interstate travel.103 These decisions affirm the existence of
a right to interstate travel, but none rule out the existence of a
corresponding right to intrastate travel.10 4 Other cases have characterized the right to travel more generally as a "right of locomotion"10 5 and a "virtually unconditional personal right."10 6 These
07
Comcases indicate that the right extends to all forms of travel.

mon sense would also suggest that if a state is barred from prohibiting
travel into its borders it should also be prevented from restricting
travel within its borders.'0 8 In the words of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, "[i]t would be meaningless to describe the right to travel
between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and not to
acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a
state."' 09

The Court's analysis in Bray and Nordlinger, thus, provides only a
rudimentary and unsatisfactory analysis of the right to travel."0 To
be sure, the Court has signaled its preference for a narrow conception
of the right to travel, but veiled hints are no substitute for clear, wellreasoned analysis.
As the nation's arbiter, it is the Court's
constitutionally assigned role to define the proper contours of the
right to travel."' Thus, even if the right to travel should be scaled
back or perhaps repudiated, the Court's surreptitious dismantling of
the right to travel is imprudent. A constitutional democracy such as
ours is premised on the notion that certain rights will be reserved to

103. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 763 (1993). The
three cases cited by the Court were Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982),
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948), and Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180

(1868). Id.
104. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 763.
105. Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
106. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969) (Stewart, J.,concurring).
107. See id. (stating that the right to travel is a broadly assertable, virtually
unconditional, personal right); see also supra notes 16, 31, 32 and accompanying text.
108. SeePaul Ades, The Unconstitutionalityof "Antihomeless"Laws:OrdinancesProhibiting
Sleeping in Outdoor Public Areas as a Vwlation of the Right to Trave 77 CAL. L. REV. 595,
609-13 (1989).
109. King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2nd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
110. See supra notes 65-85 and accompanying text.
111. This role dates back to the inception of our nation. To quote Chief Justice
Marshall, it "is the very essence ofjudicial duty" to resolve in a coherent fashion the
conflicts between the Constitution and laws. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163
(1803).
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the people and outside the arena of legislative decision-making unless
preempted by a more compelling governement interest. 112 When
the Court fails to define these rights in a coherent and principled
fashion, both the people's ability to enjoy their rights and the
community's efforts to enact legislation through the democratic
process are cast under a pall of uncertainty. As the Court itself has
recognized,
"[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
13
1

doubt."
Although the right to travel has not engendered much public
controversy, the costs of leaving the right poorly defined are great." 4
As an unenumerated right, the right to travel is unconstrained by text
and thus conducive to expansive interpretations that could interfere
with the legitimate decision-making of legislative bodies." 5 Second,
if the Court persists in leaving the right to travel ill-defined, it provides
a precedent for the creation of other similarly nebulous rights and
thus cheapens the existence of rights that truly are fundamental.
Uncertainty about fundamental rights also invites spurious litigation." 6 In fact, the muddled history of right to travel has already
proved difficult for lower federal courts to interpret" 7 and led to a
wide array of largely facetious challenges based on the right to
travel." 8 With the federal courts already overloaded, our system can

112. For example, freedom of speech, the right to life, the right to privacy, the right
to marry, inter alia,are rights generally reserved for the people; however, these rights
have been infringed upon in cases of national security and other such compelling
government interests. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (holding that
legislation which prohibited persons from congregating within 500 feet of any embassy
was not unconstitutional if the conduct threatened the embassy's "security or peace").
113. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
114. See infra notes 115, 117-19 and accompanying text.
115. It is not far-fetched to imagine courts arriving at bizarre interpretations of the
right to travel. In fact, in a recent case, one judge wrote a dissenting opinion
suggesting that the use of drug dealer profiles by police infringed on a defendant's
constitutional right to travel. United States v. Hawthorne, 982 F.2d 1186, 1192 (8th
Cir. 1992) (Arnold,J., dissenting).
116. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
117. Lower courts have struggled to make sense of the Supreme Court's right to
travel cases. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted, "[tihe Supreme
Court has yet to articulate why it has applied rational basis review in some right to
travel cases and strict scrutiny in others, except to say where a law cannot meet the
minimum rationality requirement there is no need to undertake a more searching
inquiry." Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1267 (3rd Cir. 1992).
118. For a few of the more outlandish uses of the right to travel see: Hill v. City of
Harvey, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17965, at *2 (7th Cir. July 16, 1993) (stating that the
plaintiff raises "vague, unsupported assertions about the constitutional right to travel");
Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993) (illustrating
plaintiffs argument that Idaho law requiring her to carry a license violates right to
travel); Vix v. Brown, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30571, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991)
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little afford this additional litigation." 9 Consequently, it is imperative that the Court address this issue squarely and provide some sort
of doctrinal basis for the right, thereby fulfilling its constitutional
responsibility of delineating the lines of permissible legislative decision
making.
IV. Toward a Workable Definition of the Right to Travel
A.

FundamentalRights and Equal Protection Analysis

Before constructing a new definition of the right to travel, it is
important to recognize the source of much of the Court's recent
confusion-namely its insistence on analyzing the right to travel in
terms of the Equal Protection Clause. 2 Prior to the Warren Court
era, the Court viewed the right to travel as an independent right
giving rise to its own cause of action. 2 ' Thus, in Crandall, when
reviewing the constitutionality of a state tax on passengers entering
and leaving the state, the Court focused first on the existence of the
constitutional right to travel and then asked whether the statute
impermissibly burdened the right.'2 2 Beginning in Shapiro, the
Court altered its approach by bringing the right to travel under the
rubric of its equal protection analysis, on the grounds that the right to
travel was a fundamental right and, therefore, protected by strict
scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause.'23

This shift in the Court's conceptual approach to the right to travel
made little sense.12 4 If a statute infringes either directly or indirectly
on the exercise of a constitutional right, the Court does not need to

(describing plaintiffs claim that Nevada law requiring valid driver's license violates
right to travel); United States v. Smith, 1991 U.S. App. LExiS 24806, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct.
21, 1991) (noting plaintiff's allegation that government enforcement of speeding laws
violates right to travel).
119. Judge Posner has commented that "[a]s the Federal Courts become more and
more overloaded, the costs imposed on ethical and responsible litigants when judicial
resources are diverted to the processing of frivolous claims and defenses mount higher
and higher." Hill v. Norfolk &Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987).
120. The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No state shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
121. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867) (noting that an individual's right to
travel is independent of any state's right to control that individual).
122. Id. at 39-46.
123. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
124. Michael J. Perry, Modern EqualProtection:A Conceptualizationand Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1075 (1979) (explaining that the right of interstate migration did
not offend or even implicate equal protection).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss2/14

16

1995]

Hartch: Wrong Turns: ARIGHT
CritiqueTO
of the
Supreme Court'S Right to Travel Ca
TRAVEL

rely on the Equal Protection Clause to declare the law unconstitutional.' 25 As Justice Harlan wrote in dissent in Shapiro:
[W] hen ... a classification is based on exercise of rights guaranteed
against state infringement by the Federal Constitution, then there is
no need for any resort to the Equal Protection Clause ... this Court
may properly and straightforwardly invalidate any undue burden
upon those
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
6
Clause. 1

However, in Shapiro, the Court never undertook the traditional
analysis, preferring instead to assume arguendo that "[s]ince the
classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard
of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." ' 27
Several problems emerged from the extension of equal protection
analysis to the right to travel. First, the Shapiro Court lost sight of the
central question-whether the statute created an unconstitutional
restraint on travel. 2
The Court devoted most of its opinion to
explaining why various legislative purposes were impermissible, while
giving only a brief explanation as to the nature of the burden placed
on travel.' 29 Second, since the Court simply assumed that there had
been a violation of what it deemed the "fundamental right to
travel," i" ° it never was forced to define the right itself."'
Finally,
by tethering the right to travel to the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court introduced into the right to travel debate much of the
confusion surrounding equal protection jurisprudence over standards
of review. 32
In Shapiro, the Court adopted a strict scrutiny review'3 3 but in subsequent years at times applied an intermediate
standard" s4 or rational basis test.'35 In fact, in Zobel, Chief Justice

125. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 638.
128. Id. at 618.
129. Id. at 638-42.
130. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
131. Id. at 630-31.
132. Id. at 634-38 (rejecting the rational basis test in favor of a compelling state
interest test).
133. Id. at 638. The Court maintained that as the right to travel was a "fundamental
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter
standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." Id.
134. When applying the intermediate standard of review, the Court will only uphold
legislation if it bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest.
See NOWAK, supra note 27.
135. See Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1984); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1981).
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Burger described the "right to travel analysis ... [as] little more than
a particular application of equal protection analysis."' 36
These problems point to a larger conceptual problem in the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence-namely the inclusion of fundamental
rights in general, under the Equal Protection Clause.' 7

Traditional-

ly, the Equal Protection Clause deals with "the unequal treatment of
different classes of persons by state action without adequate justification for that inequality, " s and has reserved suspect or heightened
classification based on immutable traits such as race, gender, and
alienage.'3 9 The Court extended its equal protection analysis to soWhile on paper this
called "fundamental" rights in the 1960s.1'
approach may appear logical, in practice the enterprise of reviewing
fundamental rights under the Equal Protection Clause is an invitation
to create new rights and is of little help in resolving the preliminary
issue as to whether the right has in fact been infringed.' 4' Equal
protection review for fundamental rights is therefore a superfluous
step that obfuscates the more important tasks behind the illusion of
a scientific and multi-tiered approach. 42 In recent years, the Court
has largely stopped identifying new fundamental rights,'43 but
unfortunately has yet to repudiate the heightened scrutiny equal
protection approach for the right to travel.

136. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 60 n.6.
137. See Thomas R. McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-FundamentalRight to
Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 988 (1975). Fundamental
rights are analyzed under a substantive due process approach. Id. "[S]ubstantive due
process is concerned with whether a particular state interference with some individual
interest is adequately justified." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 991.
140. The Court first applied this novel approach to fundamental rights in the
context of voting rights. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
141. See Perry, supra note 124, at 1077-80 (discussing the quasi-constitutional right
to franchise).
142. Id. at 1081-82.
143. While the Court continues to analyze the right to vote and the right to travel
under the Equal Protection Clause, it has not identified any new fundamental rights
since the early years of the Burger Court. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
189 (1986) (rejecting homosexual sodomy as an intimate association entitled to
constitutional protection); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37
(1973) (rejecting education as a fundamental right); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
74 (1972) (rejecting housing as a fundamental interest); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970) (rejecting welfare as a fundamental right). For general
criticism of the Burger Court's equal protection jurisprudence, see Gerald Gunther,
Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a New Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) (advocating a means-based model of equal
protection review).
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PossibleJustificationsfor a Broad Right to Travel

Rather than digressing into equal protection analysis, therefore, the
Court in Shapiro should have focused on the primary
question-whether a one-year residency requirement for welfare acts
as a restraint on travel.'
The Court only addressed this question
fleetingly, hypothesizing that " [a] n indigent who desires to migrate...
will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk making the move
without the possibility of falling back on state welfare assistance during
his first year of residence, when his need may be most acute."145 Yet,
even the Court realized that this was at best a makeweight argument
by concluding that the statute merely touched on rather than
infringed or penalized the right to travel.'
As one commentator
observed:
The welfare residence requirements attacked in Shapiro... did not
present even an indirect burden or penalty .... Prior to their moves
to the defendant states, the plaintiffs had absolutely no claim in

those states for welfare benefits. Immediately after moving to the
defendant states their situation with respect to those states was
unchanged-that
is, they still had no eligibility for welfare bene14 7
fits.

Shapiro is not an isolated example of the Court stretching to find an
admittedly incidental and tangential restraint on travel to override the
legislature.

For example, in Attorney General of New York v. Soto-

Lopez,'" the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute which
gave a small advantage on civil service exams to veterans who had
49
been state residents at the time of their entrance to the military.
Displaying a great deal of imagination,
the Court characterized the
50
scheme as a restraint on travel.
To arrive at this type of result, one of two approaches must be
adopted. Option one is to construe the right to travel so broadly that
any impact on travel, no matter how remote, will result in the statute
being declared unconstitutional. Perhaps this is what Justice Stewart

144. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1968). The Court merely stated
in conclusory fashion that the purpose of deterring the migration of immigrants cannot
serve as a justification for the one-year waiting period since it is constitutionally
impermissible. Id.
145. Id. at 629.
146. Id. at 638.
147. McCoy, supra note 137, at 997.
148. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
149. Id. at 909.
150. See id. at 903 (noting that a state law, through the use of classifications,
implicates the right to travel when it deters or penalizes that right).
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" ' However, in
meant by a "virtually unconditional personal right."15
52
light of the Lochner v. New York' era, the Court should at least
provide a persuasive explanation for broadly construing an
unenumerated right such as the right to travel to trump the results
reached by the democratic process. So far, the Court's best argument
is that a broad conception of the right to travel is implicit within "the
nature of our Federal Union" and an outgrowth of "personal
liberty." '
While there is undoubtedly merit to the notion that some form of
right to travel is implicit within the concept of a federal union, it is
important to realize that this rationale falls far short of justifying the
extremely broad right necessary to invalidate the statutes in Soto-Lopez
and ZobeL Indeed, the nation functioned reasonably well for almost
200 years prior to the Court's aggrandized interpretation of the right
to travel in the 1960s. It seems insincere, therefore, to describe such
a right as vital to our democracy.
Nor is such a broad right to travel supported by conventional
methods of constitutional interpretation. In terms of original intent,
there is no evidence that the Framers regarded the right to travel as
a fundamental right.'5 4 In fact, if. anything, originalist evidence
points tojettisoning the right altogether. For example, when drafting
the Constitution, the Framers did not include any provision guaranteeing the right to travel, even though the Articles of Confederation had
expressly provided that "people of each State shall have free ingress
and egress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the
privileges of trade and commerce... as the inhabitants thereof... ." 151
This omission coupled with the inclusion of the Interstate Commerce
Clause granting Congress power to regulate interstate travel strongly
suggests that the Framers did not view the right to travel as vital to the
new nation. In fact, to the extent that the Interstate Commerce

151.
152.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, plaintiff was convicted of violating New York

labor law when he worked more than sixty hours in one week in a bakery. Id. The
Court addressed the issue of whether restricting plaintiff's work hours was a valid
exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare. Id. The Court held that the law violated plaintiff's constitutional right
to contract and that his work hours were not substantially dangerous. Id. Thus, the
Court broadly construed the right to contract so as to preempt the police power of the

state. Id.
153. Id. at 629.
154. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (dating the firstjudicial allusion to
the right to travel as 1823).
155. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV.
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Clause permits Congress to regulate travel, the Constitution actually
56
disavows the notion that the right is an unfettered personal right.
Repeated attempts to derive a broad conception of the right to
travel from the text of the Constitution have proved equally futile. As
just mentioned, it seems unwise to base a fundamental right on the
Commerce Clause when the clause itself permits Congress to restrict
travel. 157

Slightly more promising is the Privileges and Immunities

Clause. Simply stated, the argument is that the Framers excluded
mention of the right to travel because they regarded travel as
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 5

This reason-

ing cannot withstand careful scrutiny. To begin with, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause traditionally has afforded no constitutional
protection to residents against the laws of their own state. 59 Therefore, a right to travel derived from the Privileges and Immunities
Clause could not be used to invalidate the type of durational residency
requirements struck down in Shapiro or ZobeL'" Second, even if the
Framers did intend to incorporate the right to travel provisions from

the Articles of Confederation into the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the nineteenth century right to travel was of rather narrow

scope. For example, the Articles of Confederation explicitly excluded
"paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives" from enjoying the right to
travel. 16 At most, therefore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
gives rise to a much more modest formulation of the right to travel.
If a broad right to travel is going to be adopted, the justification
must rest on either moral or prudential grounds. Even on these
terms, however, the argument falls short. Theoretically, a broad right
to travel might promote economic efficiency and social harmony by

156. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113A S. Ct. 753, 763 n.7 (1993)
(stating that the right to interstate travel "does not derive from the negative commerce
clause, or else it could be eliminated by Congress").
157. Nevertheless, at least on two occasions, justices have hinted that the right to
travel can be derived from the commerce clause. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
757 (1966); Bray, 113A S.Ct. at 794-95 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (citing commerce clause
cases for determining the scope of the right to travel).
158. Variations on this argument have been repeatedly made. See Zobel v. Williams,
concurring); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
457 U.S. 55, 72 (1981) (O'Connor, J.,
178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900);
Wildenthal, supra note 55, at 1557.
159. See Zobel, 457 U.S. at 84 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); Zobe4 457 U.S. at 59.
161. ARTIcLEs OF CONFEDERATION, art. IV. This exclusion makes Justice Douglas'

reliance on the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Edwards to strike down a restraint
on the travel of indigents into the State of California seem particularly misplaced.
Edwards, 314 U.S. at 160, 178-180. It is also of interest to note thatJustice O'Connor
quotes extensively from the Articles of Confederation in her concurring opinion in
Zobel but conveniently omits mention of this exclusion. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 79.
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removing hindrances for traveling from one state to another. If one
looks at Shapiro and its progeny, however, it is not at all apparent that
society is appreciably better off now that the various residency
requirements and tax schemes have been removed from the statute
books. Furthermore, if a state enacted legislation threatening the free
flow of goods, it is reasonable to believe that Congress would exercise
its extensive powers under the Interstate Commerce Clause and
expunge the law. As for moral grounds, individuals may have a
natural right to move from one place to another unimpeded.
However, this right does not translate into an entitlement to welfare
or housing every time one decides to move from state to state.
It should also be noted that a broad right to travel has substantial
costs. American states typically experiment with different legal
schemes, 62 thereby serving as laboratories for social and political
reform which, if successful, can be emulated by other states or the
federal government.16 1 Consider, for example, a statewide health
care program for AIDS patients. Permitting State X to adopt a oneyear durational residency requirement for receipt of benefits might
deter some residents of State Y from entering State X if they stand to
lose their health coverage. Without the residency requirement,
however, State X might become a magnet for AIDS patients, thus
forcing the state to offer less comprehensive heath care coverage.
Likewise, barring residency requirements creates a free-rider problem
because if residents from State Y can easily obtain benefits in State X,
State Y has less incentive to adopt its own plan. In other words, useful
policy experimentation may be one casualty of a broad right to travel.
Adoption of a sweeping right to travel may also threaten the ability
of states to promote a sense of community. In Nordlinger, the Court
correctly stated that California had a "legitimate interest in local
neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability" and that
Similarly,
Proposition 13 reasonably furthered this objective. l
residency requirements for political candidates seeking state offices
may insure better representation of constituents' interests. 6 5 A

162. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
163. Currently, a considerable amount of policy experimentation at the state level
is occurring in the area of health care. Both Hawaii and Oregon, for instance, have
enacted innovative health care plans which could serve as national models. See HAW.
REV. STAT. § 39A-51 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 127 (1994).
164. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1992).
165. Justice Brennan conceded this point in Zobelby noting that candidate residency
requirements promote "allegiance and attachment." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70
(1982). Brennan also cited with apparent approval a lower court decision upholding
New Hampshire's seven-year residency requirement for gubernatorial candidates against
a right to travel challenge. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (D.N.H.
1973).
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broad right to travel, however, would invalidate all such statutes
In
differentiating between long-term residents and new arrivals."
fact, some academics have envisioned using the right to travel to
invalidate zoning laws.167 In an age where crime and violence
increasingly threaten our communities, removing the few legal props
promoting community stability seems particularly pernicious.
The implicit anti-communitarianism associated with an expansive
reading of the right to travel is also inconsistent with American
tradition and heritage. One of the landmark developments in this
nation's westward expansion was the Homestead Act 1" which offered
free land to settlers willing to farm the land for a period of ten years.
The Homestead Act would not survive the Warren and Burger Court
analysis. If Alaska's attempt to provide a financial incentive for
69
maintaining residence in Alaska is a violation of the right to travel,1
the Homestead Act would fare no better. 7 ° Likewise, under a broad
definition of the right to travel, residency requirements for state
political candidates would be unconstitutional. Yet, the Constitution
itself imposes analogous citizenry requirements for members of
Given that this broad
Congress, Senators, and the President.'
conception of the right to travel is so wholly inconsistent with
American heritage and common sense, it is time to formulate a new
understanding of the right.
C. Newcomers as a Suspect Class
An alternate basis for reaching the result in Shapiro is to identify
newcomers as a suspect class analogous to race or alienage.' 7 2
Although the Court did not publicly espouse such an approach, in
effect this is what the Warren and Burger Courts accomplished. What
the Court objected to in Shapiro was not that welfare recipients were
being turned away at the Connecticut border, but rather that "the

166. Although the Court has stopped short of prohibiting residency requirements
for political candidates, logically a broad right to travel should bar all types of residency
requirements.

See DurationalResidency Requirements, supra note 40 at 117.

167. See Steel, supra note 40; Ades, supra note 108.
168. Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 208, 4 Stat. 420 (repealed 1891). Congress adopted
the first general preemption law in 1836 for the purpose of allowing squatters to
acquire title to public lands. See id.
169. Zobe, 457 U.S. at 65.
170. If anything, the Homestead Act seems to be a much more straightforward
burden on travel because forfeiting one's house and land is significantly more
burdensome than a relatively modest yearly dividend.
171. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, §2 (requiring seven years of citizenship for representatives); art. I, §3 (requiring nine years of citizenship for senators); art. II, §1 (requiring
fourteen years of residency as well as requiring natural born citizenship for presidency).
172. McCoy, supra note 137, at 1016-17.
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effect of the waiting-period requirement [was] to create two classes of
needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that
one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and
the second of residents who have resided less than a year in the
jurisdiction."173 Likewise, in Zobel, Chief Justice Burger was concerned that the "dividend statute creates fixed, permanent distinctions
between an ever-increasing number of perpetual classes of concededly
bona-fide residents, based on how long they have been in the
state. "174

At least conceptually, the creation of a new suspect class creates less
problems than trying to protect fundamental rights under the Equal
Protection Clause. Some scholars have attempted to use process
theory to argue that newcomers are in fact a "discrete and insular"
minority worthy of strict scrutiny protection.175 In the words of one
law professor, newcomers are "viewed as sufficiently different by
oldtimers in the political majority of any governmental unit that the
class is easily stereotyped as ignorant, unreliable, or in some other way
' 76
inadequate and unworthy of full participation in the society."
the
Consequently, it is argued that newcomers will fare poorly in
177
majoritarian process and therefore deserve judicial protection.
Nevertheless, as the Court undoubtedly recognized, identifying
newcomers as a suspect class is not a desirable option. The analogy
between traditional suspect classes based on race or alienage and
newcomers is a false one. To begin with, the framers of the Equal
Protection Clause harbored no intent to eradicate discrimination
against newcomers as a class. 178 Secondly, newcomer status, unlike
race, alienage, or gender is not an immutable characteristic.
Becoming a newcomer requires a conscious decision to move from
one state to another. Also, once having settled in a new location, a
newcomer does not retain that status in perpetuity. This is especially
true in a mobile society such as ours where it is common to move
from state to state. This feature of American society also minimizes
the likelihood that newcomers will be disadvantaged by the democratic
process because voters are unlikely to enact statutes that in the future

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59 (1982).
See McCoy, supra note 137, at 1019.
Id.
Id. at 1018-19.

178. Although for originalists this point might end the inquiry, equal protection
analysis has been used for other classes, such as gender, not contemplated by the
Framers. See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Nevertheless, even if the originalist argument is not dispositive, it does suggest

proceeding with caution lest the protection offered to suspect classes be diluted by
overuse.
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could apply to them if they chose to move to another state. Even
more importantly, while newcomers may face some obstacles, the
discrimination and hardships endured by blacks and other racial
minorities are historically of a significantly greater magnitude.
Finally, it should be noted that identifying newcomers as a suspect
class would still require the Court to enforce an independent right to

travel. Otherwise, if only the suspect class mode of analysis were used,
actual restraints on movement from one state to another would be
constitutional so long as newcomers were not treated differently than

long-term residents. In other words, treating newcomers as a suspect
class would not bar the most egregious restraints on travel.
D.

Other Options: Moderation and Abolition

Having ruled out the adoption of a broad right to travel or creation
of a new suspect class, several options remain available.
One
possibility is the endorsement of an intermediate right to travel under
which the Court could police unreasonable restraints while upholding
restraints it considers less objectionable. This more moderate and
flexible approach can be accomplished either by a direct analysis of
the burden placed on the right to travel or under the framework of a
sliding-scale equal protection analysis." 9 The obvious danger of
these approaches is that they have inherent tendencies to degenerate
into ad hoc, case-by-case decision making. In this regard, the drift of
the Burger Court, to uphold some residency requirements but strike
down others without rhyme or reason, is instructive. Nor is there
much reason to believe that the current Court could fashion a more
coherent analysis without additional guideposts.
Another option would be to abolish the right to travel entirely. This
solution undoubtedly would put an end to the confusion over the
right to travel and in the process curb facetious litigation, but it would
do so only at a heavy cost. While the options mentioned above are
troubling, so too is the notion that a right which the Court has
repeatedly affirmed for more than 150 years could simply disappear.
If the right to travel were abolished, the Court would signal that other
rights now thought to be fundamental can be swept away at the whim
of five occupants of our nation's least dangerous branch.'
Com-

179. See Elizabeth A. Johnson, Note, Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown: The
Right to Travel and the Constitutionality of Continuous Residency Requirements, 2 ALASKA L.
REV. 339, 369 (1985) (advocating a "sliding-scale approach to equal protection analysis"
for right to travel cases).
180. There is a substantial difference between overturning precedent that has been
reaffirmed repeatedly throughout history without a single justice dissenting and
reversing precedent that has either proved controversial, unworkable, or simply
unnecessary. There may be instances when such a reversal would be warranted, but
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mon sense suggests that the Court should shy away from such a drastic
step.
E. Looking for Clues in Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council 8'
A more prudent course would be to endorse a very narrow
definition of the right to travel. A model for such an approach can be
found in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councit" which construed
the Takings Clause. In Lucas, Justice Scalia stated that government
regulations in the form of zoning or environmental laws could
constitute a taking only in cases where "the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle . . 8" Scalia's opinion in Lucas provided a much needed
clarification of when government regulation amounts to a physical
taking of property that necessitates compensating the property
owner.'84 By limiting regulatory takings to cases where the owner
had been deprived of all economically beneficial uses, Scalia resolved
the issue in a pragmatic manner that limited the potential disruption
of state and local governments, while at the same time, remaining
faithful to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against the taking of
85
private property without just compensation.'
A similar analysis balancing pragmatism and history is appropriate
for the right to travel. Due to its long rhetorical tradition, the right
to travel should not be tossed aside. On the other hand, left
unconstrained, the right has the capacity to expand and, in the
process, threaten legitimate exercises of democratic power. A Lucaslike decision affirming the right but providing clear guidelines on the
narrow contours of the right is, therefore, in order.
As with the Takings Clause, restraints on travel can come in two
forms-direct governmental restraints on movement and governmental
regulation that affects travel indirectly by making one location more
attractive than another. Under a Lucas-type approach, direct and
enduring restraints on travel would be analogous to permanent
physical occupations of land and thus presumptively unconstitutional.
The California statute struck down in Edwards, which barred indigents

this type ofjudicial activism should be resorted to only in exceptional cases.
181. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
182. Id. According to the Takings Clause, private property shall not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. Id. at 2895 (emphasis added).
184. The Court first addressed this issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922) (holding that the government may to some extent diminish property values
without compensation).
185. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
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from the state, is a good example of such a law.18 6 The statute
prevented American citizens from moving from one location to
another.'87 Furthermore, this prohibition on physical restraints on
travel should apply equally to interstate and intrastate travel. Finally,
the right to travel should also bar legislation which although operating
indirectly, has the effect of blocking, rather than simply hindering or
touching on travel. Such a statute is the equivalent of a zoning
regulation that deprives all the economically viable uses of a parcel of
land. In contrast, state residency requirements and welcome stranger
tax schemes pose, at most, incidental restrictions on travel and thus
should be valid products of majoritarian rule.
Under this narrow formulation of the right, instances of legislation
that run afoul of the right to travel will undoubtedly be rare. This,
however, is actually a virtue. The courts were never intended to
replace the legislatures as the makers of public policy, only to act as
a last resort against the imposition of tyranny. Limiting judicial
intervention to extreme cases of interference with travel is, thus,
entirely reasonable. Moreover, this understanding of the right to
travel is consistent with historical practice. Prior to the Warren Court,
the right to travel was not conceived of as a bar to merely incidental
and remote burdens on movement, rather, it pertained solely to
statutes that actually blocked travel.'
This more straightforward
formulation of the right also has the advantage of providing a clear
signal to potential litigants that the courts will not entertain spurious
assertions based on the right to travel. 8 9 Finally, a narrower right
to travel would allow legislative bodies greater leeway in rewarding the
past contributions of its older residents, thereby promoting greater
attachment to the community and continued participation in public
affairs.
V. Conclusion
The history of the right to travel in the twentieth century is filled
with wrong turns and missed exits. Instead of focusing on the right to
travel itself, the Court digressed into the quagmires of equal protection analysis and has never fully recovered. In recent years, the

186. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-76 (citing CAL. WELFARE AND
INSTITUTIONS CODE §2615 (1937)).
187. Edwards, at 171.
188. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
189. As with the Takings Clause, there would still be line drawing problems for the
Court to face. However, short of abandoning the right to travel altogether, this
approach provides more guidance to the Court than other approaches. In doing so
it minimizes the likelihood that judges will interpret the right expansively. Thus,
litigants will have little incentive to raise new challenges based on the right to travel.
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Rehnquist Court has been hinting at a narrower formulation of the
right to travel, yet has failed to articulate a new definition of the right.
The movement toward a narrower conception is a welcome development but one that should be done explicitly. Consequently, the Court
should break the silence and, taking its cue from Lucas, provide a
detailed explanation that will dissipate the lingering cloud of
uncertainty surrounding the right to travel.
Gregory B. Hartch
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